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Competitive Markets without Commitment
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University of Zurich
Florian Scheuer
Stanford University
In the presence of a time-inconsistency problem with agency contracts,
we show that competitive markets can implement allocations that
Pareto-dominate those achieved by a benevolent government, and
they induce more effort. We analyze a model with moral hazard and
a two-sided lack of commitment. After agents have chosen their work,
firms can modify contracts and agents can switch firms. If the ex post
market outcome satisfies a weak notion of competitiveness and suf-
ficiently separates individuals, it is Pareto superior to a government’s
allocation with a complete breakdown of incentives. Moreover, com-
petitive markets without commitment implement more effort in equi-
librium under general conditions.
I. Introduction
The question whether—and why—markets may perform better than
governments has fascinated economists for a long time, at least since
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the work of Hayek (1945). However, despite the importance of this
question for economics and beyond, it is still hard to find formal ar-
guments for why markets may be able to outperform a benevolent gov-
ernment. Instead, the benchmark result is still provided by standard
welfare theorems according to which a benevolent government can al-
ways replicate the market outcome or even improve on it if the market
is affected by failures such as adverse selection or externalities. In this
paper, we compare markets and governments and show that a govern-
ment, even though benevolent and facing the same constraints as com-
petitive firms, may not be able to replicate the market equilibrium, but
instead implements an allocation that is Pareto dominated by the market
outcome.
In particular, the market dominates even though it is affected by an
adverse selection problem, overturning the classic justification for
efficiency-enhancing government interventions in competitive markets.
Market “failure” due to adverse selection is indeed a major argument
in both the academic and political debates on markets versus govern-
ments. For instance, the need to provide mandatory social unemploy-
ment insurance is usually derived from the argument that private un-
employment insurance markets would suffer from adverse selection and
fail (Chiu and Karni 1998). In contrast, we point out that markets with
adverse selection can outperform a government as they provide greater
incentives to exert effort, for example, to find good jobs with low un-
employment risk.
We consider a framework in which an adverse selection problem arises
endogenously from a moral hazard problem with a lack of commitment.
Ex ante, a risk-averse agent is able to affect the probability distribution
over output by choosing some hidden action, and optimal contracts
reflect a trade-off between providing incentives and insurance. However,
such contracts are subject to a fundamental time-inconsistency problem:
Whereas underinsurance is optimal ex ante so that the agent has in-
centives to exert effort, it becomes suboptimal once effort has been
chosen but before output is realized. At this stage, the need to provide
effort incentives has vanished, and a risk-neutral principal might find
it optimal to provide the agent with full insurance. The agent, antici-
pating this, then would have incentives to exert the least costly effort
level.
We examine how governments and competitive markets perform in
the presence of this time-inconsistency problem. A benevolent govern-
ment offers incentive contracts to a population of agents who differ in
their privately known disutility of effort and is free to change them after
agents have chosen their unobservable effort. We first show that, for a
large class of benevolent governments, including utilitarian ones and
those that aim at redistributing from agents who have taken high effort,
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and thus expect high output at the ex post stage, to low-effort, low–
expected output agents ex post, the unique equilibrium is such that no
agent provides effort and everybody is fully insured, because the gov-
ernment will always implement an allocation that favors low-effort agents
ex post, eliminating ex ante incentives.1
We then turn to the analysis of competitive markets, where contracts
are offered by many risk-neutral firms and there is a two-sided lack of
commitment: Firms can offer new contracts and modify their old con-
tracts, and agents can switch to other firms once they have chosen effort.
Hence, firms take the agents’ effort decision and the composition of
the population of agents as given at the ex post stage, and the moral
hazard problem becomes a standard problem of adverse selection. While
there are many ways to model competitive markets with adverse selec-
tion, suppose, for example, that the equilibrium in the ex post market
results in the separating Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) allocation. In
anticipation of this outcome with separation and underinsurance, agents
with low effort cost will find it optimal to provide high effort ex ante.
Some incentives for effort provision can thus be sustained in contrast
to the government’s equilibrium allocation since the ex post adverse
selection problem endogenously introduces commitment to refrain
from full insurance and pooling.
Importantly, this result does not depend on the specifics of Rothschild-
Stiglitz contracts but turns out to be a robust implication of competition.
We show that whenever the outcome of an ex post market satisfies a
weak notion of competitiveness, called minimal contestability (Roth-
schild 2006), and it sufficiently separates agents who have taken different
effort choices, it Pareto-dominates the government outcome. We provide
a discussion of various circumstances—in addition to the standard Roth-
schild-Stiglitz setting—under which minimally contestable and separat-
ing allocations arise. We then focus on the Miyazaki-Wilson allocation,
which includes the Rothschild-Stiglitz outcome as a special case and is
well founded game-theoretically. We show that it satisfies our axioms so
that the Pareto result applies. Also, it can be interpreted as the outcome
that a government would choose that cares only about high-effort agents
ex post and thus provides maximal incentives for effort ex ante. Whereas
the Pareto comparison depends on the government being concerned
about a welfare criterion that makes redistribution toward high–effort
cost types desirable, we show on the basis of this insight that, for any
distribution of Pareto weights that the government may use to evaluate
1 The underlying mechanism relates to what has been described as the samaritan’s
dilemma (Buchanan 1975) or the problem of soft budget constraints (Kornai, Maskin,
and Roland 2003).
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welfare, a Miyazaki-Wilson market still implements more effort than the
government under general conditions.
Our formal model captures key characteristics of a variety of real-
world allocation problems. For instance, the moral hazard problem can
be interpreted as an individual’s education decision with subsequent
labor markets, as in Boadway, Marceau, and Marchand (1996) and Kon-
rad (2001). Significant parts of education are private information and
are typically completed before binding contracts with employers are
signed. Even if there are contracts, as in the case of executive education,
agents cannot be prevented from moving to other employers some time
after their education has been completed, and employers are able to
modify employment contracts or eventually lay off employees. The
model captures exactly this setting of a two-sided lack of commitment.
Our analysis also applies to settings of insurance with ex ante moral
hazard. For instance, workers can exert effort to reduce their risk of
becoming unemployed by finding a job with low unemployment risk,
patients may affect their risk of illness by undertaking a precautionary
effort, and bankers may affect the risk of default of their loan portfolio
by monitoring borrowers. Depending on the institutional framework,
unemployment, health, or credit insurance is provided either through
competitive markets or by the government, and both lack commitment.
In particular, our model of markets captures a situation in which after
preventive effort has been chosen but before the risk is realized, agents
can switch insurers, taking along their private effort type such as their
layoff risk, health, or quality of their loan portfolio, and insurance com-
panies can modify contractual terms, resulting in an ex post adverse
selection problem.
For all these applications, we can draw both positive and normative
conclusions from our analysis. On the positive side, for instance, it pre-
dicts that private insurance markets generate more effort than govern-
ment-provided social insurance systems in the presence of commitment
problems. The reason is that governments cannot commit not to help
the weak and poor at the ex post stage, whereas markets endogenously
generate a form of commitment to refrain from full insurance and
pooling.
Beyond this general implication, there are also more specific insights
to be drawn from the model. For instance, it makes predictions about
the equilibrium level of education and the form of employment con-
tracts and, in particular, how they differ between competitive private
firms and the public sector. There are several existing explanations for
why private firms make use of explicit incentives more often than the
public sector.2 It remains questionable, however, whether the lack of
2 For instance, public-sector jobs might exhibit a multitask nature (Holmstro¨m and
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incentives in the public sector can indeed be considered as optimal
(Burgess and Ratto 2003). Our model offers an explanation without
making assumptions about exogenous differences between the public
and the private sectors other than the difference in the implicit objective
functions of governments and markets. As a consequence, the absence
of high-powered incentives in the public sector is not interpreted as
optimal.
On the normative side, our results have implications for market reg-
ulation. We emphasize that, for markets to be able to deal with the
commitment problem successfully, firms must be allowed to offer sep-
arating contracts, some of which involve underinsurance and possibly
strictly positive profits. These properties of the market equilibrium must
not be regarded as a sign of market failure, and they do not provide
support on their own for government interventions such as the provision
of mandatory social insurance against unemployment or health risk, for
instance. After having analyzed the model, we will return to these issues
in Section IV.D, where we will relate our insights to recent proposals
for regulating the markets for health and credit insurance.
The paper most closely related to ours is the seminal contribution by
Fudenberg and Tirole (1990). They observe the same time-inconsistency
problem in a principal-agent economy with a monopolistic profit-
maximizing principal. In particular, after the monopolist has offered an
initial contract and the agent has exerted effort, renegotiation occurs
subject to the constraint that the agent cannot be made worse off than
with the initial contract. The principal can therefore use the initial
contract offer to affect the agent’s reservation utility at the ex post
renegotiation stage and thus to improve commitment. In contrast, we
do not assume that initial contracts represent a constraint at the ex post
stage, neither for a government nor for firms. The benevolent govern-
ment maximizes some weighted sum of ex post utilities subject to a
resource constraint rather than profits subject to a set of reservation
utilities as in Fudenberg and Tirole’s study. As for the market, we con-
sider the case in which several profit-maximizing principals are com-
peting and there is a two-sided lack of commitment: Firms are free to
modify old contracts or offer new ones, possibly making some of their
customers worse off than initially; agents in turn are free to obtain a
contract from a competing firm. The necessity of randomization be-
tween effort levels in Fudenberg and Tirole’s study is replaced in our
model by the assumption of ex ante heterogeneity in effort costs.
Comparing the efficiency of markets and governments in a setting
Milgrom 1991), they might be affected by common agency problems (Dixit 1997), or they
could be “mission oriented” and be occupied by intrinsically motivated agents (Besley and
Ghatak 2005).
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without commitment, our paper shares a common goal with the con-
tributions by Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2008a, 2008b). However,
their modeling of both markets and governments is quite different from
the approach taken here. The provision of insurance contracts by private
firms in competitive markets is ruled out, and government policies are
distorted by political economy constraints. Moreover, their equilibria
crucially rely on reputational concerns in an infinitely repeated game.
In contrast, we completely abstract from reputational effects, assume a
benevolent government, and consider markets in which competitive
firms can offer insurance contracts that are restricted only by infor-
mational and commitment constraints.
Bisin and Rampini (2006) consider the performance of a government
without commitment, comparing the cases in which agents can or can-
not trade in anonymous markets. However, the time-inconsistency prob-
lem that they consider is different from the moral hazard problem
analyzed here. It results from the flow of information that is revealed
to the government through the agents’ initial contract choices and is
therefore an application of the ratchet effect.3 Markets are helpful in
such a setting because they may reduce the information flow to the
government and therefore its commitment problem. In contrast, we
explicitly rule out commitment problems from a ratchet effect by as-
suming that ex post contract offers cannot be conditioned on initial
contract choices. Instead, we focus on the time-inconsistency problem
related to moral hazard and make predictions about how the commit-
ment problem affects ex ante effort incentives.
Our results also complement a vast literature on public versus private
provision of goods and services in an incomplete contracts world (see
Shleifer [1998] for an overview). Whereas this literature focuses on how
privatization affects the asymmetry of information or the production
technology in a firm, we derive a clear advantage of competitive markets
over a benevolent government without assuming any differences in the
technological, informational, or commitment constraints faced by these
different institutions. In contrast to Schmidt (1996) and Bisin and Ram-
pini (2006), where privatization or the creation of anonymous markets,
respectively, is assumed to conceal information from the government
and to act as a constraint on the set of feasible policies, we show that
the establishment of competitive markets can be interpreted as the
choice of a specific, effort-prone welfare function. Thus, markets result
in superior allocations compared to a government’s allocation due to
3 See Freixas, Guesnerie, and Tirole (1985) and Dewatripont (1989) for the standard
treatments. Asheim and Nilssen (1996) study the consequences of such ratchet effect
commitment problems for equilibrium in competitive insurance markets.
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the different objective function that they implicitly maximize, not due
to a difference in the informational or commitment constraints.
Finally, our work relates to the literature on tax competition (e.g.,
Kehoe 1989; Conconi, Perroni, and Riezman 2008). In the case of capital
taxation, this research has studied the effect of competition between
countries on the time-inconsistency problem that results from the fact
that capital taxes are highly distortive ex ante, but not ex post, after
capital has been accumulated. The focus of this literature is on the
optimal degree of cooperation between countries, facing a trade-off
between disciplining effects of noncooperative behavior and an adverse
race to the bottom.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces our model
economy. We then proceed to compare competitive equilibria without
commitment to those achieved by a benevolent government with the
same commitment problem. In Section III, we provide a comparison
based on a general, axiomatic treatment of competitive market out-
comes. In Section IV, we examine in greater detail some market out-
comes that satisfy the axioms and are well founded game-theoretically.
Section V presents conclusions.
II. The Model
We consider the following model economy. There is a continuum of
risk-averse agents, indexed by the set [0, ). Agents are expected utility
maximizers with a Bernoulli utility function , where c is consump-U(c)
tion. The function is twice continuously differentiable, with ′U(c) U 1
and . Following Fudenberg and Tirole (1990), we assume that′′0 U ! 0
both the domain and the range of U are given by , so that
and . We also assume that the Inadalim U(c)p  lim U(c)p cr cr
condition is satisfied. Let be the inverse func-′lim U (c)p 0 F(U )cr
tion of U, which then satisfies , , ,′ ′′F 1 0 F 1 0 lim F(U )p Ur
, and .′lim F(U )p  lim F (U )p Ur Ur
Each agent faces idiosyncratic risk with respect to the amount of
consumption good that she produces for a principal. Production output
can be either high, , or low, , with . The probability of eithery y y ! yh l l h
output depends on the level of effort that the agent has exerted.¯e  {e, e }
Since the ex ante moral hazard problem becomes a problem of adverse
selection ex post, we say that an agent who chooses the high effort e¯
becomes an ex post good type (g), whereas an agent who chooses the
low effort becomes an ex post bad type (b). Good types produce thee
high output with probability and bad types with probability , wherey p ph g b
holds. In an insurance application, represents each0 ! p ! p ! 1 yb g h
agent’s endowment, and is a possible damage that occurs withy  yh l
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low probability for low risks (who have exerted preventive effort)1 pg
and with larger probability for high risks.1 pb
The agents’ preferences are assumed to be separable between con-
sumption and effort, so that overall utility is given by , whereU(c)H(e)
denotes effort cost. We normalize to zero. Agents differ inH(e) H(e)
their disutility of effort , which is given by their index¯H(e)p d d 
and which we refer to as their ex ante cost type. The composition[0, )
of the population is described by a continuous distribution function G,
defined on with for all . We adopt the convention of G(d)p 0 d ≤ 0
extending G to and we assume that G has an associated densityG()p 1
g that satisfies for all . Note that, throughout theg(d) 1 0 d  [0, )
paper, neither effort cost nor effort choice will be observable.
For our analysis it is convenient to operate in the utility space. In this
space, a contract that a government or a firm offers to an agent is a
tuple of consumption utilities that the agent obtains when2(u , u )  h l
producing the high and the low output, respectively. A contract allo-
cation is a quadruple , where is the con-4(u , u , u , u )   (u , u )b,h b,l g,h g,l b,h b,l
tract intended for bad types and the one intended for good(u , u )g,h g,l
types.
In terms of the applications discussed above, the cost d can be inter-
preted as an ex ante skill type, affecting the disutility of effort such as
obtaining education, looking for a high-quality job, staying healthy, or
monitoring borrowers. At the ex post stage, this then translates into an
adverse selection problem with good and bad types, that is, individuals
who differ in their privately known human capital or the quality of their
job, patients who differ in their health status, or banks with different
loan portfolios. Good types have the lower risk of being affected by the
low outcome , such as becoming unemployed, getting ill, or sufferingyl
defaults of loans. Insurance contracts specify payments and thus con-
sumption utilities and contingent on these outcomes, which canu uh l
be interpreted as a payment scheme for an employee or an insurance
contract with a premium to be paid in case of the high outcome andyh
an indemnity paid out when the bad outcome is realized.yl
III. Markets versus Governments
Throughout this section, we are concerned with the comparison be-
tween a benevolent government and competitive markets without com-
mitment. We consider the government first in subsection A, followed
by an axiomatic analysis of markets in subsection B.
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A. A Benevolent Government without Commitment
Our first result, which predicts a complete breakdown of incentives for
a large class of governments, is a generalization of an analogous result
by Boadway et al. (1996) in the setting of education and taxation under
a utilitarian government. We consider the following reduced timing:
Stage 1: Agents simultaneously choose their effort level.
Stage 2: The government announces a policy, that is, a set of two
contracts.
Stage 3: Agents simultaneously choose between the offered con-
tracts.
One could think of stage 1 being preceded by an additional stage in
which the government announces an initial policy. Then the agents
choose an effort level in anticipation of some final policy, possibly dif-
ferent from the announcement. If the government is not committed to
its initial announcement, it is free to change the policy ex post, after
effort choice has taken place (but remains unobservable). The initial
announcement is then irrelevant, as captured by the reduced time struc-
ture. This argument assumes that initial announcements do not con-
stitute binding reservation constraints to a government, as opposed to
the monopolistic firm in Fudenberg and Tirole (1990).
In an insurance application, the policy could be an optimally designed
social insurance arrangement, such as mandatory public health insur-
ance in which individuals can choose between different levels of cov-
erage. In an education and job market application, the policy describes
the payment structure of jobs in the public sector, such as in schools
or prisons (Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997) or in other firms owned
by the state (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2002).
We solve the game backward. First, for any given unobservable effort
choice in stage 1 and policy announcement in stage 2, each ex post
type selects the best contract in stage 3, where we break tiesk  {g, b}
in favor of the contract with a coverage closer to full insurance, that is,
smaller absolute difference . Stage 3 can then be eliminatedFu  uFh l
by subsuming this choice into the government’s payoff function. We
can next derive the government’s optimal policy at stage 2 when effort
choices have been made. Observe first, however, that optimal effort
choices in stage 1 must be of a threshold type in any equilibrium, with
a critical value such that the effort choice of ex ante typeˆd   ∪ {}0
d is given by if and by if . Whenever an agent with effortˆ ˆe¯ d ! d e d ≥ d
cost d finds it optimal to choose the high effort, in anticipation of some
final policy, the same holds for any agent with . Thus, in any′d ≤ d
equilibrium, agents with small effort cost ( ) choose the high effortˆd ! d
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and those with high effort cost ( ) choose the low effort, and theˆd ≥ d
share of good types in the society becomes .4ˆG(d)
Suppose that the government has formed a correct belief about ˆd
and the share of good types . Let denote the relative weightˆ ˆG(d) W(d)
placed on good types in the government’s ex post welfare evaluation.
For example, this weight equals the population share of good types for
a utilitarian government, so that . In general, we can deriveˆ ˆW(d)p G(d)
the whole ex post Pareto frontier and, by an appropriate choice of
weights, can even capture governments that are concerned about effort
directly or take into account individual effort costs in a nonseparable
manner, as long as their implemented policy is ex post efficient. Then,
whenever so that both ex post types exist, the benevolentˆd  (0, )
government solves the following problem, which we refer to as program
:ˆBG(d)
ˆmax W(d)[p u  (1 p )u ]g g,h g g,l
4(u ,u ,u ,u )b,h b,l g,h g,l (1)
ˆ [1W(d)][p u  (1 p )u ]b b,h b b,l
subject to the constraints
p u  (1 p )u ≥ p u  (1 p )u , (2)g g,h g g,l g b,h g b,l
p u  (1 p )u ≥ p u  (1 p )u , (3)b b,h b b,l b g,h b g,l
ˆ ˆG(d)[p F(u ) (1 p )F(u )] [1 G(d)][p F(u )g g,h g g,l b b,h (4)
ˆ(1 p )F(u )] ≤ R(d).b b,l
The government maximizes a weighted average of the expected utilities
of good and bad types subject to the two standard incentive constraints
and the resource constraint. Here,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆR(d)p {G(d)p  [1 G(d)]p }y  {1 G(d)p  [1 G(d)]p }yg b h g b l
are per capita resources. The following lemma characterizes the solution
of this problem (see also, e.g., Bisin and Gottardi 2006).
Lemma 1. Fix any . (i) BG( ) has a unique solutionˆ ˆd  (0, ) d
. (ii) If , thenBG BG BG BG BGˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆV (d)p (u (d), u (d), u (d), u (d)) W(d) ≥ G(d)b,h b,l g,h g,l
and . Furthermore,BG BG BG BG BGˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆu (d)p u (d){ u (d) u (d) ≥ u (d)b,h b,l b g,h g,l
BG BG BG BG BGˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆu (d)p p u (d) (1 p )u (d) ≤ p u (d) (1 p )u (d)b b g,h b g,l g g,h g g,l
holds. (iii) If , then andBG BG BGˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆW(d) ≤ G(d) u (d)p u (d){ u (d)g,h g,l g
4 Since effort choice remains unobservable, we do not need to derive the government’s
optimal policy for effort choice profiles different from such threshold profiles, because
deviations from an equilibrium candidate are not observed.
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. Furthermore,BG BGˆ ˆu (d) ≥ u (d)b,l b,h
BG BG BG BG BGˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆu (d)p p u (d) (1 p )u (d) ≤ p u (d) (1 p )u (d)g g b,h g b,l b b,h b b,l
holds.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 1 demonstrates how the government’s optimal policy at the
ex post stage depends on the Pareto weights assigned to ex post good
and bad types. In particular, the ex post Pareto frontier can be decom-
posed in two parts: The first regime, characterized in part ii of the
lemma, involves redistribution from bad to good types (as captured by
, so that the government attaches a larger weight to goodˆ ˆW(d) ≥ G(d)
types than their population share) and is therefore such that the bad
types’ incentive constraint (3) binds, the bad types obtain full insurance,
and the good types partial insurance. The other regime, which arises if
(part iii of the lemma), involves the opposite direction ofˆ ˆW(d) ≤ G(d)
redistribution ex post, from good to bad types. Therefore, the good
types’ incentive constraint (2) binds and they obtain full insurance and
the bad types overinsurance. Clearly, good types obtain the higher ex
post expected utility than bad types in the first regime and the lower
one in the second regime. A special case arises when , andˆ ˆW(d)p G(d)
thus both types are weighted at their population share. Then, at the
optimum, both types get full insurance and there is complete pooling:
. Note that, since the effort choiceBG BG BG BGˆ ˆ ˆ ˆu (d)p u (d)p u (d)p u (d)b,h b,l g,h g,l
has already been taken, the government without commitment does not
care about providing effort incentives with its policy at the ex post stage,
but only about achieving optimal redistribution across the two ex post
types.
If , that is, if all agents are either good types or bad types,ˆd  {0, }
the government’s problem BG prescribes the utility maximization ofˆ(d)
the unique ex post type, subject to a resource constraint. First, resources
will clearly be exhausted in the solution. Second, convexity of F implies
that the solution entails an output-independent payment. Hence for
we analogously define by5BGˆ ˆd  {0, } V (d)
BG BG BG BGˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆu (d)p u (d)p u (d)p u (d)p U(R(d)).b,h b,l g,h g,l
Similarly to Fudenberg and Tirole (1990, definition 3.1), we now define
an equilibrium with a benevolent government without commitment as
follows.
Definition 1. An equilibrium with a benevolent government (EBG) is a
pair where (i) and (ii)BG(d*, V *) V *p V (d*)
5 We let and be elements of for notational consistency, even thoughBG BG 4V (0) V () 
there is only one ex post type if . One can still think of as theBG BGˆ ˆ ˆd  {0, } (u (d), u (d))k,h k,l
best contract for type among those offered, even though only one type actuallyk  {g, b}
exists and the government offers a single contract only.
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BG BG BG BGd*p p u (d*) (1 p )u (d*) p u (d*) (1 p )u (d*).g g,h g g,l b b,h b b,l
If effort choice is described by some and the government has formedˆd
a correct belief, it will implement ex post. Condition ii capturesBG ˆV (d)
that in stage 1 agents will anticipate this outcome, so that their actually
optimal effort choice is described by the threshold
BG BG BG BG BGˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆD (d)p p u (d) (1 p )u (d) p u (d) (1 p )u (d).g g,h g g,l b b,h b b,l
This holds because each agent calculates her ex post utility from being
a good type (choosing the good type’s optimal contract) and the cor-
responding utility from being a bad type and compares the difference
to her effort cost d. The function therefore yields the indifferentBGD
cost type given any threshold , and no agent has an incentive to deviateˆd
if and only if the fixed-point condition and hence con-BGd*p D (d*)
dition ii is satisfied.
Given the above results on the solution for varying levels ofBG ˆV (d)
, the following result is immediate.ˆd   ∪ {}0
Proposition 1. For any distribution of Pareto weights W, (0,
) is an EBG. It is the unique EBG if .BGV (0) W  GFOSD
If the government puts weakly overproportional weight on bad types
ex post for any given , captured by (i.e., W weakly dominatesˆd W  GFOSD
G in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance), continuation con-
tracts are always such that the segment of the ex post Pareto frontier
is attained, which is described in part iii of lemma 1. Since the govern-
ment aims at redistributing from good to bad types at the ex post stage,
bad types obtain the (weakly) higher continuation expected utility than
good types, which of course eliminates any effort incentives from an ex
ante perspective. If is not satisfied, the complete breakdownW  GFOSD
of incentives remains an equilibrium: If all agents choose the low effort,
any government implements a full insurance allocation ex post. Addi-
tional EBG might, however, emerge in that case. We examine such equi-
libria in Section IV.
B. Competitive Markets without Commitment
We now turn to the case in which contracts are provided by competitive
firms rather than by a benevolent government, and both firms and
agents are unable to commit to contracts before the hidden effort
choice. That is, we consider a time structure with a two-sided lack of
commitment, where, after an initial phase of contract offers and agents’
choices of contracts and effort, firms are free to alter their existing
contracts and offer additional ones, whereas agents are free to abrogate
their contract and choose a new one, possibly switching between firms.
As argued in the introduction, we do not allow the firms’ new contract
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offers or modifications to be conditioned on an agent’s initial choice
of contract. In the first place, this allows us to isolate our commitment
problem from ratchet effects (Freixas et al. 1985). Second, it captures
the realistic scenario that firms can modify concluded contracts only if
they do not target specific individuals. For instance, insurance contracts
can contain clauses that give the firm the right to modify terms of the
contract without discriminating between customers. The decision
whether to accept or to opt out of the contract is then left to the insurant,
as in our model. However, the insured person can often cancel the
policy with relatively short notice. In an education application, long-
run contracts that arrange the terms of employment before educational
choices have been made often do not exist at all, yielding an equivalent
game-theoretic structure:
Stage 1: Agents choose an effort level.
Stage 2: Some market game takes place, resulting in a set of offered
contracts.
Stage 3: Agents simultaneously choose a contract.
The structure is exactly the same as for the government. In particular,
we assume that ex ante contracts (if they exist) do not constitute binding
reservation constraints, and therefore, we do not exogenously assume
better commitment opportunities for private firms than for the govern-
ment. Also, all assumptions about information and observability are as
before.
The key here is that the comparison between markets and govern-
ments that we derive in the following does not require a detailed spec-
ification of the market game in stage 2, nor does it rest on the particular
equilibrium notion for the ex post market. We assume only that, after
agents have chosen their effort according to a threshold , firms formˆd
a correct belief about and some ex post market game takes place,ˆd
which results in an equilibrium set of contract offers. While the market
game for given effort could be complicated, with respect to the timingˆd
of moves or its observability assumptions, we restrict attention to its
outcome, that is, to the two contracts among the final offers that max-
imize the utility of the two different effort types and will thus be chosen
in stage 3. We denote this outcome, for a fixed but yet unspecified ex
post market game, by and proposeM M M M Mˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆV (d)p (u (d), u (d), u (d), u (d))b,h b,l g,h g,l
the following equilibrium definition, which is completely analogous to
the EBG definition in subsection A.
Definition 2. An equilibrium with competitive markets (ECM) is a pair
in which (i) is the ex post market outcome givenM(d*, V *) V *p V (d*)
and (ii)d*
M M M Md*p p u (d*) (1 p )u (d*) p u (d*) (1 p )u (d*).g g,h g g,l b b,h b b,l
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We now proceed to formulate plausible conditions on the outcomes
, which essentially require informational and resource feasibilityM ˆV (d)
as well as a minimal degree of competitive pressure. This approach
builds on the insights of Rothschild (2006), who has observed a similar
robustness property in a setting of categorical discrimination in insur-
ance markets. In particular, we impose the following axioms.
(C1). is incentive compatible, that is,M ˆV (d)
M M M M ′ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ′ ′p u (d) (1 p )u (d) ≥ p u (d) (1 p )u (d) Gk, k  {g, b}.k k,h k k,l k k ,h k k ,l
(C2). is resource feasible, that is,M ˆV (d)
M M Mˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆG(d)[p F(u (d)) (1 p )F(u (d))] [1 G(d)][p F(u (d))g g,h g g,l b b,h
M ˆ ˆ(1 p )F(u (d))] ≤ R(d).b b,l
(C3). is minimally contestable; that is, there does not exist anM ˆV (d)
incentive-compatible outcome , , , such that (1)˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜Vp (u u u u )b,h b,l g,h g,l
for all and (2) and˜ ˜ ˜ ˜p (u , u ) ≥ 0 k  {g, b} p (u , u ) 1 0k k,h k,l k k,h k,l
M Mˆ ˆ
˜ ˜p u  (1 p )u 1 p u (d) (1 p )u (d)k k,h k k,l k k,h k k,l
for some , wherek  {g, b}
p (u , u )p p [y  F(u )] (1 p )[y  F(u )]k h l k h h k l l
are the profits earned with one unit of type k agents in contract ( ,uh
).ul
Clearly, any market outcome has to satisfy (C1) and (C2), ir-M ˆV (d)
respective of the exact structure of the market. The third requirement
(C3), introduced by Rothschild (2006), formalizes the aforementioned
minimal degree of competitive pressure. It precludes the existence of
two incentive-compatible deviation contracts that make nonnegative
profits whatever types they attract and strictly positive profits for at least
one type who, at the same time, strictly prefers them to . ThisM ˆV (d)
rules out market outcomes that do not survive even the slightest degree
of competitive pressure. Again following Rothschild (2006), let us pro-
vide an example for an outcome that satisfies conditions (C1)–M ˆV (d)
(C3).
Example.—Consider the Rothschild-Stiglitz contracts andRS RS(u , u )g,h g,l
, where is the output-independentRS RS RS(u , u ) u p U(p y  (1 p )y )b b b b h b l
payoff for bad types, and the good type’s contract satisfies ,RSp (ug g,h
and . These contracts are indepen-RS RS RS RSu )p 0 p u  (1 p )u p ug,l b g,h b g,l b
dent of , and the outcome satisfies conditionsRS RS RS RS RSˆd V p (u , u , u , u )b b g,h g,l
(C1) and (C2) for any by definition. It also satisfies (C3)ˆd  (0, )
because simultaneously maximizes the utility of both types amongRSV
the incentive-compatible pairs of contracts that break even individually.
The example illustrates that axioms (C1)–(C3) are actually weak. Even
though the Rothschild-Stiglitz contracts might not be considered a rea-
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sonable market outcome for all (e.g., because of equilibriumˆd  (0, )
nonexistence problems), they still satisfy the axioms. Also, we will later
illustrate that the axioms do not rule out cross subsidization between
ex post types, so that outcomes satisfying them might still be susceptible
to cream-skimming behavior. But these considerations strengthen our
following result, which is based on (C1)–(C3) only and will thus hold
a fortiori for market outcomes that satisfy even stricter requirements.6
C. A Comparison
We will now compare markets based on properties (C1)–(C3) to a gov-
ernment as analyzed above. Our concept of Pareto dominance applies
to ex ante utilities; that is, we say that an equilibrium Pareto-dominates
another if it gives every agent (i.e., every ex ante cost type) a weakly
larger and at least one a strictly larger overall utility, including effort
cost. The effort level might be different for some types between the two
equilibria.
Theorem 1. Any ECM in which and(d*, V *) d*  (0, ) V *p
satisfies (C1)–(C3) Pareto-dominates the EBG .M BGV (d*) (0, V (0))
Proof.—Suppose that satisfies (C1)–(C3). We first showMV *p V (d*)
that
M Mp u (d*) (1 p )u (d*) ≥ p U(y ) (1 p )U(y ) Gk  {g, b}k k,h k k,l k h k l
must hold. Assume to the contrary that this is violated for a type j 
and consider the outcome ,˜{g, b} Vp (U(y ) e, U(y ) e, U(y ) eh l h
for small . The outcome is incentive compatible and˜U(y ) e) e 1 0 Vl
satisfies for all by definition. Also,p (U(y ) e, U(y ) e) 1 0 k  {g, b}k h l
for sufficiently small, we have thate
M Mp [U(y ) e] (1 p )[U(y ) e] 1 p u (d*) (1 p )u (d*)j h j l j j,h j j,l
still holds, so that violates (C3), a contradiction. Thus anyMV *p V (d*)
outcome that satisfies (C1)–(C3) must be individually rational as defined
by Rothschild (2006).
Consider the Rothschild-Stiglitz contracts as introduced before. They
satisfy and hence, since , .RS RS RS RS RSu 1 u p 1 p p u  (1 p )u 1 ug,h g,l g b g g,h g g,l b
Lemma 13 in Rothschild (2006), considering the special case of only
two types, now implies that satisfiesMV (d*)
6 The axioms (C1)–(C3) coincide with those used by Rothschild (2006) except for two
differences. First, in the definition of minimal contestability, Rothschild requires the de-
viation to be resource feasible, but this is implied by property 1 in the definition of˜V
(C3) and can be omitted. Second, in addition to (C1)–(C3), Rothschild also requires a
market outcome to be individually rational, which amounts to the assumption that
M Mˆ ˆp u (d) (1 p )u (d) ≥ p U(y ) (1 p )U(y ) Gk  {g, b}.k k,h k k,l k h k l
As we show in the proof of theorem 1, this axiom is actually not independent; i.e., it is
implied by (C1)–(C3) and can also be omitted.
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M M RS RSp u (d*) (1 p )u (d*) ≥ p u  (1 p )ug g,h g g,l g g,h g g,l
and
M M RSp u (d*) (1 p )u (d*) ≥ u ;b b,h b b,l b
that is, both types are ex post weakly better off in than in theMV (d*)
Rothschild-Stiglitz contracts. Since andRS BG RSu p u (0) p u  (1b g g,h
, this implies that ex post Pareto-dominatesRS RS BG Mp )u 1 u p u (0) V (d*)g g,l b
.BGV (0)
Condition ii in definition 2 then implies that
M M Mp u (d*) (1 p )u (d*) d 1 p u (d*)g g,h g g,l b b,h
M RS BG (1 p )u (d*) ≥ u p u (0)b b,l b
for all , where the first inequality follows directly from conditiond ! d*
ii in definition 2 and the other comparisons from the above argument
for ex post Pareto dominance. Hence all agents who prefer the high
effort ( ) and subsequently contract in the ECMM Md ! d* (u (d*), u (d*))g,h g,l
have a strictly larger utility, including effort cost, than they obtain as
bad types in the EBG. Agents preferring low effort are weakly(d ≥ d*)
better off, from the above comparison. QED
We thus do not need to know exactly how markets work. The theorem
shows that two properties of market equilibria are sufficient to make a
Pareto comparison. First, the market has to be minimally contestable.
Second, the market must be able to sustain some incentives for effort
provision, captured by the assumption of an interior share of good types
in equilibrium. We have already illustrated the plausibilityd*  (0, )
of minimal contestability in the previous section. To show that markets
without commitment can actually be able to sustain incentives, we again
consider the Rothschild-Stiglitz example.
Example continued.—Assume that for all . SinceM RSˆ ˆV (d)p V d  (0, )
is separating with , the optimal critical valueRS RS RS RSV p u  (1 p )u 1 ug g,h g g,l b
for effort choice in anticipation of ,M RS RSˆV (d)p V Dp p u  (1g g,h
, is strictly positive and independent of . Thus isRS RS RSˆp )u  u d (D, V )g g,l b
an ECM that satisfies the prerequisites of theorem 1.
The example illustrates that a sufficient degree of ex post separation
for all is necessary to sustain incentives, which specificallyˆd  (0, )
requires that some separation is sustained as the share of good types
goes to zero. Moreover, the separation has to be such that good types
are better off ex post. For example, in regime iii from lemma 1 the
government might also separate types, but bad types are better off,
leading to a breakdown of incentives from an ex ante perspective. Cor-
rect ex post separation is indeed necessary to obtain an ECM in which
good types do exist. But the existence of both types does not already
guarantee that the allocation Pareto-dominates the government’s out-
come. If the minimal notion of competition as captured by (C3) is not
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satisfied by a separating outcome, we cannot expect it to be Pareto
superior to . Consider, for example, a profit-maximizing monop-BGV (0)
olist that screens the population of agents ex post and extracts as many
resources as possible. Then, even if there is an equilibrium in which
both types do exist and are separated, the outcome will generally not
leave both types better off than in . In fact, agents will be strictlyBGV (0)
worse off whenever their outside option is sufficiently unattractive.
Hence, while our comparison between markets and governments does
not depend on the details of the market game, it depends on the as-
sumption that the market is competitive at least to some degree.
IV. The Implicit Redistributive Objective of Markets
A. Market Foundations
The results in the previous section were based on axioms on market
outcomes. We have illustrated them using the standard Rothschild-Stig-
litz separating allocation. Unfortunately, as is well known, the Roth-
schild-Stiglitz equilibrium concept may run into nonexistence problems.
However, there are various ways to overcome this problem. For instance,
Riley (1979) has restored existence by considering a reactive equilibrium
concept that involves deviators anticipating their competitors’ reaction,
and Bisin and Gottardi (2006) show that the Rothschild-Stiglitz sepa-
rating allocation is always a Walrasian equilibrium when agents are re-
stricted to trade incentive-compatible consumption bundles contingent
on the states h, l. Similarly, Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) dem-
onstrate that the nonexistence problem vanishes in a setting with ca-
pacity constraints or search frictions.
Another problem with the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium, even if it
exists, is that it restricts firms to offer only one contract, ruling out cross
subsidization and therefore leading to potential inefficiency. 7 Since such
a restriction is not imposed on our benevolent government, it may bias
the comparison in favor of markets. Indeed, restricting the number of
contracts that firms can offer amounts to a restriction of their ex post
deviation possibilities, reducing the scope for profitable deviations from
initial announcements and therefore increasing commitment. However,
we demonstrate in Netzer and Scheuer (2009) that the comparison of
markets and governments does not rely on such a restriction. In par-
ticular, we provide a game-theoretic foundation for the Miyazaki-Wilson
equilibrium (Miyazaki 1977), which includes Rothschild-Stiglitz as a spe-
cial case and is always Pareto efficient, by constructing an extensive form
market game in which firms can offer any finite number of contracts
7 This assumption is shared by many approaches in the literature on competitive in-
surance markets, such as Wilson (1977) and Hellwig (1987).
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and in which a unique robust subgame-perfect equilibrium always exists.
We show that the resulting equilibrium allocation is the solution to a
maximization problem, which we characterize and discuss in the fol-
lowing.8
B. Miyazaki-Wilson ECM
Consider the contracts characterized by the following program, denoted
by MW( ):ˆd
max p u  (1 p )u (5)g g,h g g,l
4(u ,u ,u ,u )b,h b,l g,h g,l
subject to the constraints
p u  (1 p )u ≥ p u  (1 p )u , (6)g g,h g g,l g b,h g b,l
p u  (1 p )u ≥ p u  (1 p )u , (7)b b,h b b,l b g,h b g,l
ˆ ˆG(d)[p F(u ) (1 p )F(u )] [1 G(d)][p F(ug g,h g g,l b b,h (8)
ˆ (1 p )F(u ))] ≤ R(d),b b,l
F(p u  (1 p )u ) ≥ p y  (1 p )y . (9)b b,h b b,l b h b l
In program MW( ), the expected utility of good types is maximizedˆd
under the ex post incentive compatibility constraints (6) and (7), the
resource constraint (8), and a constraint (9) that requires the certainty
equivalent of the bad types’ contract to be at least as large as their
expected endowment. This constraint makes sure that cross subsidiza-
tion can go only from good to bad types in any solution because it
implies that the resource cost of the bad types’ contract must always be
weakly larger than their expected output; that is, it earns zero or negative
profits taken on its own. Note that, in a comparison with BG( ), theˆd
only two differences are the additional constraint (9) and the objective
function (5), which is a special case of (1) putting weight exclusively in
good types.
Lemma 2. Fix any . (i) MW( ) has a unique solutionˆ ˆd  (0, ) d
MW MW MW MW MWˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆV (d)p (u (d), u (d), u (d), u (d)).b,h b,l g,h g,l
(ii) satisfies (C1)–(C3). Furthermore,MW MW MWˆ ˆ ˆV (d) u (d)p u (d){b,h b,l
, , andMW MW MWˆ ˆ ˆu (d) u (d) 1 u (d)b g,h g,l
8 Bisin and Gottardi (2006) show that the Miyazaki-Wilson allocation can also be ob-
tained in their setting if agents have to buy consumption rights in a separate Walrasian
market before they can go to insurance markets and trade contingent consumption bun-
dles there.
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MW MW MW MW MWˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆu (d)p p u (d) (1 p )u (d) ! p u (d) (1 p )u (d).b b g,h b g,l g g,h g g,l
Proof. See the Appendix.
The problem characterizes the so-called Miyazaki-Wilson contracts.
There are two cases depending on whether constraint (9) does or does
not bind. If it does, each contract individually makes zero profits, and
we obtain the classical Rothschild-Stiglitz outcome. Otherwise, the flat
contract for bad types makes negative profits and the incentive contract
for good types makes positive profits, implying cross subsidization from
good to bad types. For completeness, we again briefly turn to the case
in which and simply define byMWˆ ˆd  {0, } V (d)
MW MW MW MWˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆu (d)p u (d)p u (d)p u (d)p U(R(d))b,h b,l g,h g,l
for .ˆd  {0, }
Now suppose that the ex post market actually leads to a Miyazaki-
Wilson contract; that is, suppose that for all . Then,M MWˆ ˆ ˆV (d)p V (d) d
to characterize the set of equilibria of the complete game without com-
mitment, called MW-ECM, we need to find the fixed points of the func-
tion
MW MW MW MW MWˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆD (d)p p u (d) (1 p )u (d) p u (d) (1 p )u (d),g g,h g g,l b b,h b b,l
which gives us the indifferent ex ante cost type if agents antic-MW ˆD (d)
ipate the final outcome . If , we know from lemma 2MW ˆ ˆV (d) d  (0, )
that , so that we can sim-MW MW MW MWˆ ˆ ˆ ˆu (d)p u (d)p p u (d) (1 p )u (d)b,h b,l b g,h b g,l
plify toMW ˆD (d)
MW MW MWˆ ˆ ˆD (d)p (p  p )[u (d) u (d)]. (10)g b g,h g,l
Also, we immediately obtain . Let us collect someMW MWD (0)p D ()p 0
useful properties of the function in the following lemma. TheseMWD
properties are based on comparative static effects of varying levels of
on the solution .MWˆ ˆd V (d)
Lemma 3. (i) is continuous on (0, ). (ii) andMW MW ˆD lim D (d) 1 0ˆdr0
. (iii) IfMW ˆlim D (d)p 0ˆdr
′′d F (u) ≥ 0, (11)′du F (u)
there exists such that is flat on (0, ] and strictlyMW˜ ˆ ˜d  (0, ) D (d) d
decreasing on .˜(d, )
Proof. See Netzer and Scheuer (2009).
Properties i and ii together with imply that, whileMW MWD (0)p 0 D
is continuous otherwise, it has a discontinuity at . The reason isˆdp 0
that a contract with output-independent utilities and hence no incentive
for effort provision is the unique ex post outcome if , whereas forˆdp 0
any positive the good type’s contract remains high powered. Specif-ˆd
ically, we show in the proof of the lemma that (9) is binding in
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Fig. 1.—Fixed-point problem with Miyazaki-Wilson markets
for sufficiently small but positive , which is saying that theMW ˆ ˆV (d) d
Rothschild-Stiglitz contracts obtain if the given share of good types is
small. As , however, the good type’s contract converges to anˆd r 
output-independent, full-insurance contract, which requires cross sub-
sidization to the bad types to preserve incentive compatibility. Condition
(11) was introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1990). We show that, if
it is satisfied, there is exactly one critical value at which the transition˜d
from zero to positive cross subsidization occurs, and an increase in ˆd
above leads to an increased subsidy and lower-powered incentives˜d
such that is strictly decreasing. Fudenberg andMW MW MWˆ ˆu (d) u (d) Dg,h g,l
Tirole (1990) show that (11) is satisfied whenever risk aversion is not
decreasing too quickly in income (see their lemma 3.2), for example,
for constant relative risk aversion preferences with a coefficient of at
least one. Figure 1 depicts the function for such preferences.MW ˆD (d)
We can now state the main result of this subsection, which is a direct
implication of the previous results and standard fixed-point theorems.
Proposition 2. (i) The pair is an MW-ECM. (ii) ThereMW(0, V (0))
exists a value such that is an MW-ECM. (iii) UnderMWd* 1 0 (d*, V (d*))
condition (11), there are no additional equilibria.
Clearly, is always a fixed point of , meaning that there isMWˆdp 0 D
competitive markets without commitment 1099
an MW-ECM in which no agent exerts effort and everyone obtains a
contract with an output-independent payment. However, there always
exists at least one other fixed point of and hence an MW-MWd* 1 0 D
ECM in which a nonzero mass of agents exert the high effort. Since
is weakly decreasing under condition (11), the positive fixed pointMWD
is unique in this case. Otherwise, multiple nonzero fixed points and
associated MW-ECM may exist.
C. Comparing MW-ECM to EBG
We are now in a position to compare market equilibria based on ex
post Miyazaki-Wilson contracts to equilibria with a benevolent govern-
ment. We will present two main results in this subsection. The first,
theorem 2, compares welfare between the two types of equilibria. The
second, theorem 3, compares the induced aggregate effort levels.
Theorem 2. Any MW-ECM with ex ante Pareto-MW(d*, V (d*)) d* 1 0
dominates the EBG , and strongly so if satisfies (9)BG MW(0, V (0)) V (d*)
with slack.
Proof. We consider two cases, depending on whether constraint (9)
is binding or not in . Assume first that it does, implyingMWV (d*)
; that is, bad types inMW BG MWu (d*)p U(p y  (1 p )y )p u (0) V (d*)b b h b l
obtain the same utility as all agents in , where nobody exerts anyBGV (0)
effort. By definition of , we then have thatd*
MW MW MW BGp u (d*) (1 p )u (d*) d 1 u (d*)p u (0)g g,h g g,l b
for all . Given that is a fixed point of , the critical valueMWd ! d* d* D
determines optimal effort choice in , so that all good typesMWd* V (d*)
in are ex ante (including effort cost) strictly better off thanMWV (d*)
they are as bad types in . If (9) is slack in , thenBG MWV (0) V (d*)
, and both low and bad types are ex ante strictly betterMW BGu (d*) 1 u (0)b
off in , with the same argument. QEDMWV (d*)
The first part of theorem 2 is a corollary of previous results (although
we present a convenient direct proof above): satisfies (C1)–MWV (d*)
(C3) according to lemma 2, so we can immediately apply our general
theorem 1 to obtain the Pareto comparison. The second part of theorem
2 goes beyond the general insight of theorem 1. If the market equilib-
rium involves cross subsidization from agents who choose to become
good types to those who prefer to become bad types, as captured by
slackness of (9), even all agents are strictly better off in the market than
under a benevolent government.
The intuition for theorem 2 is that in the EBG all agentsBG(0, V (0))
end up being bad types in a contract with an output-independent payoff,
equal in size to their expected output. In the market, only some agents
remain bad types, obtaining a flat payment at the same or even a sub-
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sidized level, whereas the other agents prefer to become good types and
choose a contract that makes them strictly better off. Hence it is the ex
post adverse selection problem in competitive markets, leading to un-
derinsurance of some agents, that is crucial for the dominance of mar-
kets over governments. Konrad (2001), in an extension of Boadway et
al. (1996), compares the optimal tax policy of an informed to an un-
informed utilitarian government and also finds that information rents
due to ex post asymmetric information can sustain effort incentives and
be Pareto improving. We emphasize, however, that we impose the same
assumptions about information on both markets and the government,
and, as opposed to Schmidt (1996), Konrad (2001) and Bisin and Ram-
pini (2006) do not compare different information structures. From our
perspective, establishing a competitive market can be interpreted as the
delegation of decisions to a government that cares only for good types
and faces the additional constraint (9). The similar idea that the creation
of an independent agency and the subsequent delegation of decisions
to this agency can be beneficial in the presence of a commitment prob-
lem is central to the research on central bank independence. In our
model, the advantage of a market is that it acts as if it was a specific
government, whereas individual firms are still maximizing their real
objective (profits). This avoids incentive problems that would be present
with an independent agency such as a central bank (Walsh 1995).
According to proposition 1, is always an EBG, and theBG(0, V (0))
unique one whenever the government is concerned about a utilitarian
welfare criterion or aims at redistributing toward agents with high effort
cost. If is not satisfied, then the welfare comparison in the-W  GFOSD
orem 2 can become inapplicable because EBG with a positive share of
good types might emerge. It is indeed not possible to make a general
Pareto comparison between markets and government in that case. For
instance, a government that cares almost only for low–effort cost agents
might want to implement cross subsidization from bad to good types
and thereby make bad types worse off than in an MW-ECM, where this
direction of cross subsidization is impossible. However, we are now going
to show that it is possible to compare the aggregate level of effort im-
plemented by a government with a general distribution W of Pareto
weights to that implemented by competitive markets. Despite the po-
tential multiplicity of EBG, we still have the following result.
Theorem 3. Suppose that condition (11) is satisfied and the interior
MW-ECM satisfies . Then for any EBGMW ˜(d*, V (d*)) d* 1 d d* ≥ d**
.BG(d**, V (d**))
Proof. See the Appendix.
According to the theorem, whenever condition (11) is satisfied and
the MW-ECM involves cross subsidization, the associated equilibrium
share of good types is higher than the share of good typesG(d*)
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in any EBG, irrespective of the distribution of Pareto weights WG(d**)
that is used. Hence, in terms of incentives for effort, a benevolent gov-
ernment cannot do better than the market. The reason is again that
Miyazaki-Wilson markets replicate an extreme government that cares
only about ex post good types.
The restriction to the case in which the MW-ECM involves cross sub-
sidization is necessary because, as argued above, our markets are con-
strained by the fact that there cannot be cross subsidization from bad
to good types, whereas the government is not. A government that is
otherwise similar to the market, in that it puts a large weight on good
ex post types, may find it optimal to make these good types even better
off, at the expense of bad types, which increases the incentive to exert
effort. As proposition 1 makes clear, this can occur only if the govern-
ment puts sufficiently overproportional welfare weight on low–effort cost
types.
D. Implications for Market Regulation
The previous results have important implications for market regulation.
They highlight that competitive firms must be allowed to offer separating
contracts for markets to be able to implement allocations that dominate
the government outcome. More important, the market equilibrium in-
volves underinsurance for some agents, and it may require cross sub-
sidization where firms use strictly positive profits that they earn with
some contracts to finance the losses incurred with other contracts. All
these three properties—separation, underinsurance, and cross subsi-
dization—are crucial for the above results that markets sustain higher
effort incentives than a government and that they implement an ex post
Pareto-efficient outcome that (strictly) dominates the government’s
allocation.
These insights cast doubt on regulatory policies that aim at achieving
standardization of contracts, reduce underinsurance, or enforce actu-
arial fairness of individual contracts. For instance, our model applies to
the moral hazard problem that banks face in monitoring their loan
portfolio and the time-inconsistency problem related to credit insur-
ance. From an ex ante perspective, less than full credit insurance is
optimal in order to incentivize banks to monitor their borrowers, but
ex post, a private credit insurer or government may insure banks fully
against the risk of default of their loan portfolio, for example, in the
form of a bailout. Competitive credit insurance markets, as for instance
in the form of a credit default swap market, stay away from full insurance
because of the adverse selection problem at the ex post stage, where
the quality of different banks’ loan portfolios is private information. For
this, however, it is important that more than one type of credit insurance
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contract can be traded in the market, notably that they can differ in
the amount of coverage, and that they may not individually make zero
profits in expectation. This is in contrast to recent discussions about
reorganizing the credit default swap market (see, e.g., Stulz 2010).
There, a popular proposal is to move away from an over-the-counter
market with individualized contracts to exchange trading with stan-
dardized contracts, where actuarial fairness is mechanically enforced.
As far as there is a similar ex ante moral hazard problem in health
insurance markets (see, e.g., Dave and Kaestner [2006] for evidence),
the results also make clear that underinsurance and strictly positive
profits of some insurance policies in competitive health insurance mar-
kets must not be viewed as signs of market failure, calling for regulatory
intervention. Instead, they are key to sustain preventive incentives and
achieve Pareto efficiency. Legal constraints on deductibles and coin-
surance, as contained in the current U.S. health care reform bill, may,
if binding, be detrimental to achieving these objectives.9
V. Conclusion
We have analyzed the performance of competitive markets in the frame-
work of a time-inconsistency problem with incentive contracts. We have
first pursued an axiomatic approach, based on weak properties that ex
post market outcomes should satisfy to be considered competitive. We
have shown that such outcomes Pareto-dominate the allocation that a
large class of redistributive government can achieve, whenever markets
are able to sustain some incentives for effort provision through sepa-
rating agents ex post (theorem 1). We have then examined a specific
but well-justified ex post market outcome in greater detail. If the ex
post market produces Miyazaki-Wilson contracts, incentives for effort
provision are preserved ex ante and our general Pareto result applies.
It turns out that, in this case, the market replicates a benevolent gov-
ernment that cares only about high-effort agents and thus sustains max-
imal incentives for effort provision.
Our further results identify the level of cross subsidization between
ex post types in the market as an important property to assess outcomes.
First, the comparison between markets and governments becomes a
strong Pareto dominance result whenever the market equilibrium entails
cross subsidization (theorem 2). Second, even if the Pareto comparison
is not applicable, because the government does not belong to the above-
mentioned class, we can still compare the aggregate equilibrium effort
between market and government if the market cross-subsidizes. In that
9 For a summary of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, see the report of
the Kaiser Family Foundation (2010).
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case, the market always performs better than a government in terms of
incentives for effort (theorem 3). Altogether, our results suggest that
competitive markets are an institution that is able to deal with the com-
mitment problem very successfully, even in a model that excludes any
reputational mechanisms.
Our model provides a transparent framework in which a benevolent
government cannot replicate the outcome achieved by a market. This
result is not due to exogenously assumed differences in technologies,
commitment constraints, policy instruments, or information but is based
solely on the different objectives that the two institutions pursue (im-
plicitly, in the case of the market). To transparently expose the effect
of competition on the commitment problem, we have ruled out repu-
tational effects in our analysis. Future research on how competition and
reputation interact may produce further interesting insights.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
We prove the lemma by proving a sequence of preliminary claims. We suppress
dependency on for notational convenience.ˆd
Claim 1. Constraint (4) must be binding in any solution ,Vp (ub,h
to BG.u , u , u )b,l g,h g,l
Proof. Assume that V satisfies all constraints and (4) with slackness. Consider
for . Then satisfies (2) and (3) and˜ ˜Vp (u  e, u  e, u  e, u  e) e 1 0 Vb,h b,l g,h g,l
leads to a strictly increased value of (1). Continuity of F implies that (4) is still
satisfied by for sufficiently small, so that V was not a solution to BG.˜V e
Claim 2. Any solution V must satisfy .u  u ≤ u  ub,h b,l g,h g,l
Proof. Adding (2) and (3) yields, after rearranging, (p  p )(u  u ) ≤g b b,h b,l
. Together with , the claim follows.(p  p )(u  u ) p 1 pg b g,h g,l g b
Claim 3. Any solution V must satisfy for at least one .u p u k {g, b}k,h k,l
Proof. Suppose that the claim is not true and consider all possible cases. First,
may hold. Define and consider˜0 ! u  u ≤ u  u u p p u  (1 p )ub,h b,l g,h g,l b b b,h b b,l
. By construction, satisfies (3), and the value of (1) is the˜ ˜˜ ˜Vp (u , u , u , u ) Vb b g,h g,l
same under V and . Since and , it follows that˜V p 1 p u 1 ug b b,h b,l
˜ ˜ ˜p u  (1 p )u 1 p u  (1 p )u p u p p u  (1 p )ug b,h g b,l b b,h b b,l b g b g b
so that satisfies (2) as well, given that it is satisfied by V. Strict convexity of F˜V
implies that
p F(u ) (1 p )F(u ) 1 F(p u  (1 p )u )b b,h b b,l b b,h b b,l
˜ ˜ ˜p F(u )p p F(u ) (1 p )F(u ),b b b b b
so that satisfies (4) with slackness given . As in the proof of claim˜V G (0, 1)
1, the value of (1) can then be increased above its value for and V, so that V˜V
was not a solution. An analogous argument reveals that a solution cannot satisfy
. Assume finally that . Defineu  u ≤ u  u ! 0 u  u ! 0 ! u  ub,h b,l g,h g,l b,h b,l g,h g,l
and . If , then ,˜˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜u p p u  (1 p )u u p p u  (1 p )u u 1 u Vp (ub b b,h b b,l g g g,h g g,l g b b
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satisfies all constraints but (4) with slackness, from the previous ar-u˜ , u , u )b g,h g,l
gument, so that V was not a solution. The same holds for ˜ ˜ ˜Vp (u , u , u , u )b,h b,l g g
if and for if .˜˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜u ! u Vp (u , u , u , u ) u p ug b b b g g g b
Claim 4. Let V be a solution to BG. If for , thenu p u { u k {g, b}k,h k,l k
for ; that is, type k’s incentive constraint is satisfiedu p p u  (1 p )u j( kk k j,h k j,l
as an equality.
Proof. Suppose first that but, to obtain a contradiction,u p u { u u 1b,h b,l b b
. Incentive compatibility then implies . Considerp u  (1 p )u u ! ub g,h b g,l g,l g,h
for . The value of (1) is the same˜Vp (u , u , u  e, u  e 7 (p )/(1 p )) e 1 0b b g,h g,l g g
under as under V and (2) is still satisfied. For sufficiently small, (3) is also˜V e
still satisfied by , given slackness in V. Strict convexity of F immediately implies˜V
that (4) is slack in , so that V was not a solution to BG, as argued before. The˜V
case in which is proven analogously.u p ug,h g,l
Claims 1–4 imply that any solution V to BG must exhaust resources and satisfy
either
4V I p {(u , u , u , u )  Fu p u p p u  (1 p )u , u ≤ u }1 b,h b,l g,h g,l b,h b,l b g,h b g,l g,l g,h
or
4V I p {(u , u , u , u )  Fu p u p p u  (1 p )u , u ≥ u }.2 b,h b,l g,h g,l g,h g,l g b,h g b,l b,l b,h
Observe that any automatically satisfies constraint (2) because , andV I p 1 p1 g b
any satisfies (3). Hence we can formulate the program BG′, which hasV I 2
the same solutions as BG, as follows:
max W[p u  (1 p )u ] (1W)[p u  (1 p )u ] (A1)g g,h g g,l b b,h b b,l
(u ,u ,u ,u )I ∪Ib,h b,l g,h g,l 1 2
subject to
G[p F(u ) (1 p )F(u )] (1G)[p F(u ) (1 p )F(u )]p R. (A2)g g,h g g,l b b,h b b,l
Let and . It is immediate thatmax max max max max maxu p U(R) V p (u , u , u , u )
, , and satisfies (A2). Denote by the program givenmax max max ′V  I V  I V BG1 2 1
by (A1) and (A2) with the additional restriction that only and by ′V I BG1 2
the analogous program in which .V I 2
Claim 5. has a unique solution . It satisfies if and only if′ maxBG V V p V1 1 1
.W ≤ G
Proof. Any solution to must be of the form with′BG Vp (u , u , u , u )1 b b g,h g,l
or, equivalently, . The condi-u p p u  (1 p )u u p (u  p u )/(1 p )b b g,h b g,l g,l b b g,h b
tion can then be reformulated as . We can therefore state theu ≥ u u ≥ ug,h g,l g,h b
following modified problem , which has the same solutions as :′′ ′BG BG1 1
1 p p  pg g bmax W u  u  (1W)u (A3)b g,h b( ) ( )[ ]1 p 1 p(u ,u )Fu ≥u b bg,h b g,h b
subject to
u  p ug,hb bG p F(u ) (1 p )F  (1G)F(u )p R. (A4)g g,h g b( )[ ]1 pb
Denote the left-hand side of (A4) by . The function E is continuouslyE(u , u )g,h b
differentiable on , and straightforward calculations reveal that it is strictly2
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increasing in whenever , with because of con-u u ≥ u lim E(u , u )p g,h g,h b u r g,h bg,h
vexity. The function E is strictly increasing in globally, with .u lim pb u rb
We first claim that represents the largest possible choice of . Considermaxu ub
the tuple , which satisfies (A4) by definition. Any tuple withmax max ˜ ˜(u , u ) (u , u )g,h b
, , and thus can be reached from by firstmax max max max˜ ˜ ˜ ˜u ≥ u u 1 u u 1 u (u , u )g,h b b g,h
increasing from to and then increasing from to . Bothmax max˜ ˜u u u u u ug,h g,h b b
moves strictly increase , so that violates (A4), which proves the˜ ˜E(u , u ) (u , u )g,h b g,h b
claim.
Now fix any . It follows that , withmax max max maxu ≤ u E(u , u ) ≤ E(u , u )p Rb b
strict inequality whenever . Since is strictly increasing inmaxu ! u E(u , u ) ub g,h b g,h
in the relevant range, with , it follows that there exists alim E(u , u )p u r g,h bg,h
unique value such that , where . ThemaxH(u ) E(H(u ), u )p R H(u ) ≥ u ≥ ub b b b b
resulting function is continuously differentiable andmax maxH : (, u ] r [u ,)
thus continuous, by the implicit function theorem.
We can now reduce to the one-dimensional problem′′BG1
p  p p  pg gb bmax 1W u W H(u ). (A5)b b( )
max 1 p 1 pu Fu ≤u b bb b
We first claim that is strictly concave. Let and satisfy′ ′ ′′ ′′H(u ) (u , u ) (u , u )b g,h b g,h b
and . Define′ ′ ′′ ′′ ′ ′ ′′ ′′ ′′′ ′E(u , u )p E(u , u )p R (u , u )( (u , u ) u p lu  (1g,h b g,h b g,h b g,h b g,h g,h
and for . Strict convexity of F then implies′′ ′′′ ′ ′′l)u u p lu  (1 l)u l (0, 1)g,h b b b
that , which in turn implies that′′′ ′′′E(u , u ) ! Rg,h b
′′′ ′ ′′ ′′′H(u )p H(lu  (1 l)u ) 1 ub b b g,h
′ ′′p lu  (1 l)ug,h g,h
′ ′′p lH(u ) (1 l)H(u ),b b
which proves the claim. Second, implicit differentiation of (A4) reveals that H
is strictly decreasing with slope
′ ′G(1 p )F (u ) (1G)(1 p )F (u )g g,l b b′H (u )p , (A6)b ′ ′G(1 p )p F (u )G(1 p )p F (u )g b g,l b g g,h
where and has been resubstituted for . Ob-u p H(u ) u (u  p u )/(1 p )g,h b g,l b b g,h b
serve that . As decreases, increases and′lim H (u )p 0 u u p H(u ) uu r b b g,h b g,lb
decreases. Therefore, both terms in the numerator and the first term in the
denominator of (A6) are decreasing as is decreasing (but they remain pos-ub
itive). Since , it follows that , and thuslim E(u , u )p lim H(u )p u r g,h b u r bb b
the second term in the denominator of (A6) grows without bound as u rb
, because of the Inada condition . Hence′ ′lim F (u)p  lim H (u )pur u r bb
holds.0
Strict concavity of implies that the objective in (A5) is strictly concaveH(u )b
whenever and strictly increasing in if . Together with the factW 1 0 u Wp 0b
that the objective must be strictly increasing in for sufficiently small valuesub
of , because and , this implies′u lim H (u )p 0 1W(p  p )/(1 p ) 1 0b u r b g b bb
existence and uniqueness of a solution .V1
We prove that if and only if by showing that the slope ofmaxV p V W ≤ G1
the objective (A5) evaluated at is (weakly) positive if and only ifmaxu p ub
. The result then follows from strict concavity of and maxW ≤ G H(u ) H(u )pb
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. Suppose . The respective condition then ismaxu W 1 0
p  p p  pg gb b ′ max1W W H (u ) ≥ 0, (A7)
1 p 1 pb b
and after we use in (A6) and some rearrangements it followsmax maxH(u )p u
that
G(p  p ) (1 p )g b b′ maxH (u )p .
G(p  p )g b
After substituting this in (A7), canceling terms, and using , we obtain thatp 1 pg b
(A7) is equivalent to . If , then (A5) is strictly increasing in , andW ≤ G Wp 0 ub
the claim follows immediately.
Claim 6. has a unique solution . It satisfies if and only if′ maxBG V V p V2 2 2
.W ≥ G
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of claim 5 and therefore is omitted.
Lemma 1 now follows. Since and , whenevermax maxV  I V  I V (1 2 1
, then is the unique solution to the unrestricted prob-max BGV p V V p V  I2 1 1
lem BG′ and hence BG, satisfying all properties given in part ii. This is the case
if and only if . Analogously, implies andmax BGW 1 G V p V ( V V p V  I1 2 2 2
satisfies the properties given in part iii, which is the case if and only ifBGV
. If , claims 5 and 6 immediately imply that , whichBG maxW ! G Wp G V p V
satisfies the properties given in parts ii and iii.
Proof of Lemma 2
MW is a special case of BG for , with the additional constraint (9). There-Wp 1
fore, claims 1–4 in the proof of lemma 1 apply unaltered, because none of the
arguments is affected by (9).
Ignore constraint (9) and consider claim 6 above. It implies that maxV p V2
is the unique solution to because . Since obviously satisfies′ maxBG Wp 1 ≥ G V2
(9), it is also the unique solution when constraint (9) is imposed additionally.
Then, since as well, solutions to MW are identical to solutionsmax MWV  I V1
of for and under the additional constraint (9). Since any′BG Wp 1 V I1 1
must be of the form , (9) can be reformulated asVp (u , u , u , u ) u ≥b b g,h g,l b
, where because . Then, with the samemin min maxU(p y  (1 p )y ){ u u ! u p ! pb h b l b g
arguments as for lemma 1, MW can be reformulated analogously to (A5) as
1 p p  pg g bMWu p arg max u  H(u ). (A8)b b b( ) ( )
min max 1 p 1 pu [u ,u ] b bb
Existence and uniqueness of now follow as before, with the additionalMWV
simplification of a lower bound on the choice of . Also, the argumentsminu ub
for claim 5 above imply that because since . ThisMW max ˆu ! u Wp 1 1 G d (0,)b
in turn implies , the second inequality from the re-MW MW MW MWu ! u ! H(u )p ug,l b b g,h
sults for claim 5 above and the first from incentive compatibility. This establishes
the strict inequalities in lemma 2.
Conditions (C1)–(C3).—To show that satisfies conditions (C1)–(C3), con-MWV
sider the Rothschild-Stiglitz contracts , which solveRS RS RS RS RSV p (u , u , u , u )b,h b,l g,h g,l
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max p u  (1 p )ug g,h g g,l
4(u ,u ,u ,u )b,h b,l g,h g,l
subject to the constraints
′
′ ′p u  (1 p )u ≥ p u  (1 p )u Gk, k  {g, b},k k,h k k,l k k ,h k k ,l
G[p F(u ) (1 p )F(u )] (1G)[p F(u ) (1 p )F(u )] ≤ R,g g,h g g,l b b,h b b,l
and
′F(p u  (1 p )u )p p y  (1 p )y Gk, k  {g, b}.k k,h k k,l k h k l
In a comparison with MW, this program involves the same objective function
but a strictly smaller constraint set, implying MW MW RSp u  (1 p )u ≥ p u g g,h g g,l g g,h
. Moreover, constraint (9) in MW impliesRS(1 p )ug g,l
MW MW RS RSp u  (1 p )u ≥ U(p y  (1 p )y )p p u  (1 p )u .b b,h b b,l b h b l b b,h b b,l
Therefore, weakly Pareto-dominates . The result then follows fromMW RSV V
lemma 13 in Rothschild (2006).
Proof of Theorem 3
Fix a value and consider two cases. First, suppose that .ˆ ˆ ˆd (0,) W(d) ≤ G(d)
Then, arguing as for proposition 1, we obtain . Second, consider theBG ˆD (d) ≤ 0
case . Lemma 1 implies that the unique solution to BG( ) is suchˆ ˆ ˆW(d) 1 G(d) d
that constraint (3) holds with equality, and .BG BG BG BGˆ ˆ ˆ ˆu (d)p u (d) u (d) ≥ u (d)b,h b,l g,h g,l
From the fact that , it then follows that (2) is automatically satisfied.p 1 pg b
Defining
ˆ ˆ ˆp(d){ pW(d) p [1W(d)], (A9)g b
the solution must therefore be such that solves the simplifiedBG BGˆ ˆ(u (d), u (d))g,h g,l
problem
ˆ ˆmax p(d)u  [1 p(d)]u (A10)g,h g,l
(u ,u )Fu ≤ug,h g,l g,l g,h
subject to the resource constraint
ˆG(d)[p F(u ) (1 p )F(u )]g g,h g g,l (A11)
ˆ ˆ [1G(d)]F(p u  (1 p )u )p R(d),b g,h b g,l
which is binding as shown in the proof of lemma 1. Suppose . First, forˆ ˜d 1 d
, holds. Otherwise, if , by lemma 2 theBG MWˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˜dp  D (d)p D (d)p 0 d (d,)
outcome is such that solvesMW MW MWˆ ˆ ˆV (d) (u (d), u (d))g,h g,l
max p u  (1 p )u (A12)g g,h g g,l
(u ,u )Fu ≤ug,h g,l g,l g,h
subject to the same budget constraint (A11) because (9) does not bind for
as shown in the proof of lemma 3. Since (A11) is a convex constraint byˆ ˜d 1 d
the proof of lemma 1 and holds by (A9), the solutionsˆp(d) ≤ pg
and must be such thatBG BG MW MWˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(u (d), u (d)) (u (d), u (d))g,h g,l g,h g,l
BG MW BG MWˆ ˆ ˆ ˆu (d) ≤ u (d) and u (d) ≥ u (d).g,h g,h g,l g,l
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This implies
BG BG BGˆ ˆ ˆD (d)p (p  p )[u (d) u (d)]g b g,h g,l
MW MWˆ ˆ≤ (p  p )[u (d) u (d)] (A13)g b g,h g,l
MW ˆp D (d).
Under property (11) and , the function is strictly decreasing inMW˜ ˆd* 1 d D d
above its unique interior fixed point , so that for all . To-MW ˆ ˆ ˆd* D (d) ! d d 1 d*
gether with (A13) and , this impliesBG MW BG MWˆ ˆD ()p D ()p 0 D (d) ≤ D (d) !
for all , so that any fixed point of must satisfy .BGˆ ˆd d 1 d* d** D d** ≤ d*
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